Democratic Transition Theory And Civil-Military Conflict: A Case Study Of Indonesia And Egypt by Alldredge, Jackson
  
DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION THEORY 
 AND CIVIL-MILITARY CONFLICT: 
A CASE STUDY OF INDONESIA AND EGYPT 
 
 
 
 
 
A THESIS 
PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL 
OF CORNELL UNIVERSITY 
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE DEGREE OF 
MASTER OF ARTS 
 
BY 
JACKSON QUE ALLDREDGE 
JANUARY 2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2015 Jackson Que Alldredge 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 Countries undergoing democratic transitions experience a wide range of long-term 
outcomes. Depending on the initial circumstances of the transition, a number of factors can 
impact on the trajectory of a transitioning country. Factors regarding the organization of the 
civilian government and the military, which are determined by the history and social context of 
each country, affect they type of relationship that forms between the military and the government 
during a democratic transition. This paper focuses on the cases of Indonesia and Egypt as 
examples of successful and unsuccessful democratic transitions respectively. Egypt and 
Indonesia had similar initial circumstances at the time of their transitions from authoritarian to 
democratic modes of government, but each experienced different levels of conflict between the 
military and civilians. This paper examines how the interaction between factionalism in the 
military and the government affect the stability of the democratic transition. The presence of 
factionalism within the military and the elected government may help to reduce conflict 
throughout reform periods by enabling mutually beneficial political alliances to form between 
the military and the government. 
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I. Introduction: Democratic Transition Theory 
 
 In the “third wave” of democracy,1 many countries in the developing world emerged 
from decades of authoritarian rule to begin experimenting with electoral systems of government. 
While this trend has been encouraging, the scholarly community continues to have major 
disagreements about the actual causes of democratic transitions in countries with authoritarian 
governments. Recently a large number of transitioning countries have experienced setbacks to 
reform and have in some cases reverted back to an authoritarian mode of government. This 
prompts a question with growing importance about how new democracies stay democratic. In 
Indonesia, the long-term effects of authoritarian rule, such as government corruption and the 
politicization of the military, appear heavily entrenched. Despite this, Indonesia has had a 
relatively high level of success among Southeast Asian countries in consolidating its democracy 
during the past sixteen years. In Egypt, prior to the democratic transition begun in 2011 after the 
fall of the Mubarak regime, many factors concerning the authoritarian government and society 
appeared similar. However, Egypt’s transition to democracy ended shortly after it began with a 
tragic reversal of efforts to liberalize politics. What differences between these two cases help to 
explain their different trajectories? For a democratic transition to continue on a path of success, 
what factors must be present in the political process to prevent a coup by the military that halts 
the process of political reform?  
In understanding democratic transitions, a comparative study will help to identify what 
are the most important factors affecting the long-term outcome. This paper compares political 
events in Indonesia beginning in May, 1998, and in Egypt from January, 2011. The study 
                                                          
1 See Samuel P. Huntington, 1991, The third wave: democratization in the late twentieth century, Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press. 
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considers a democratic transition to be an event in which an authoritarian government transfers 
the powers of state governance to groups in civil society in order to hold elections. The success 
of a democratic transition is measured by the ability to hold free and fair elections and to grant 
legitimacy to a civilian-elected government without a return to authoritarianism. This thesis will 
analyze the level of internal factionalism in the military and in the civilian government to explain 
the development of conflict between them. It will argue that the presence of factions within the 
military and the civilian government produces a situation in which factions in the military are 
able to secure their aims through coordinated alliances with civilians without resorting to 
intervention. By contrast, low factionalism in civilian government and the military creates a 
combustible situation as a dominant civilian party in government excludes a solidary military, 
which compels the military to take greater risks in defense of its interests. In examining these 
two cases, the paper will incorporate aspects of several theories on democratization and coup 
prevention, including cultural, rational choice, and group-dynamic explanations to show that the 
presence of factionalism in the military and in the government contributes to different outcomes 
in each case.  
Case Selection: Egypt and Indonesia 
 First, let us consider the extent to which the two cases are similar. In the wake of Egypt’s 
Arab Spring in early 2011, a number of scholars came out with predictions for Egypt’s transition, 
using Indonesia’s past trajectory of democratic reform as a road map. Pointing out the 
similarities between the two countries after Egypt’s presidential election in 2012, Indonesian 
researcher John Sidel described a future for Egypt that follows Indonesia’s trajectory during the 
last ten years. He makes the following prediction: 
The military establishment will cede formal power to a civilian government but continue to 
enjoy informal power and prerogatives for years to come.... Overall, the years ahead will 
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see the entrenchment of an oligarchic democracy, one in which the politics of money and 
machinery predominate while the military continues to exercise considerable influence.”2 
 
Sidel’s predictions rely on multiple assumptions that overlook important differences between 
Indonesia and Egypt. These include differences in Egypt’s relationship with foreign donors, the 
conditions of its economy, and the particular arrangement of Egyptian partisan politics. External 
factors differed in terms of the U.S.-Egyptian donor relationship, which had a more significant 
effect on events in Egypt than in Indonesia. The significant flow of aid money to Egypt from the 
U.S. in theory gave the U.S. government more power to influence the decisions of leaders in 
Egypt. By contrast, trade sanctions had already been imposed by congress on the Indonesian 
military, meaning that the U.S. government had less financial leverage on Suharto and 
Indonesia’s generals (Haseman 2009). However, external pressure for reform from international 
organizations such as the IMF on the regime in Indonesia would have had a comparable effect on 
Suharto as Mubarak, neutralizing that difference. The internal economic conditions of the two 
countries also differed in major ways. Egypt’s economy had not experienced the same level of 
sustained growth as Indonesia’s economy did beginning in the 1960s, although it had 
experienced modest growth rates since the 1980s. Also, in Egypt, a collapse in economic 
conditions did not become the instigator of popular revolts that led to a regime change as it did in 
Indonesia following the rapid devaluation of the Indonesian currency in 1997.3 However, 
economic grievances were similarly at the core of protesters’ demands in Egypt (Kuhn 2012).  
The most important difference that has relevance to the argument of this paper is in the 
role of political Islam in these two cases. Despite the fact that both countries have large Muslim 
                                                          
2 John T. Sidel, “Separated at Birth: Indonesia’s transition to democracy can tell us a lot about the likely course of 
Egypt’s revolution. There’s good news and there’s bad news,” Foreign Policy, 15 February, 2012. 
3 Dan Murphy, “Indonesia and Egypt separated at birth? No, just completely separate,” Christian Science Monitor, 
17 February, 2012. 
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populations with important consequences for national politics, the particular shape taken by 
political Islam in each of these countries differs greatly. In Egypt, the Muslim brotherhood, the 
most successful political party during the post-transition elections, does not have a corollary in 
Indonesian politics. While it may be tempting to directly compare the role of the Brotherhood 
and President Morsi in Egypt with that of the Muslim group, NU4, in Indonesia, it would be a 
mistake. Although the presidential candidate of the NU, Abdurrahman Wahid, had a strong 
Muslim identity, he nevertheless openly opposed an Islamist agenda in Indonesia. By contrast, 
the Mohamed Morsi’s platform in the Egyptian case was explicitly Islamist. 
 While far from being “separated at birth,”5 however, neither are these two cases 
“completely separate”.6 A number of relevant similarities exist between the two cases that enable 
comparisons of the transition process. For example, the fact that the transfer of power underwent 
similar phases of negotiations between politicians and military leaders has greater relevance for 
this question than the presence of largely Muslim populations in both countries. In both cases, 
the pressures for democratic reform were directed at a well-entrenched military regime with an 
authoritarian leader. Although Indonesia had aspects of a “personalist” regime7 just before the 
transition, both countries had long histories of rule by the military, which had become heavily 
tied into national politics. In both cases, the military would play a central role in the transition 
from the previous regime to a democratic system as it would hold all the power to either 
guarantee stability or to crack down on civilian reformers with force. As a result, the senior 
                                                          
4 Nahdlatul Ulama. 
5 John T. Sidel, “Separated at Birth: Indonesia’s transition to democracy can tell us a lot about the likely course of 
Egypt’s revolution. There’s good news and there’s bad news,” Foreign Policy, 15 February, 2012. 
6 Dan Murphy, “Indonesia and Egypt separated at birth? No, just completely separate,” Christian Science Monitor, 
17 February, 2012. 
7 Barbara Geddes distinguishes between party, military and personalist authoritarian regimes in her study on the 
longevity of authoritarian regimes. Personalist regimes are typically the most volatile as the reins of power center on 
one leader. See Barbara Geddes, 1999, “What Do We Know about Democracy after Twenty Years?” Annual 
Reviews Political Science, Los Angeles: UCLA Press. 
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officers in the military and a few influential leaders in civil society had an immense amount of 
power over the direction that the transition would take in each case. 
Coup Theory 
 The comparison of Egypt and Indonesia in this paper relies on several other theories both 
about the causes of military coups in the context of democratizing countries. Focusing analysis 
on the behavior of key actors in government, other theoretical models provide a useful 
framework for understanding motivation of military leaders to intervene. From Edward 
Luttwak’s depiction of the coups in Coup d’état: A Practical Handbook comes a segment of 
theory on military interventions around the concept of “coup-proofing.” James Quinlivan defines 
this as the “creation of structures that minimize the possibilities of small groups leveraging the 
system” to quickly seize power over the state (Quinlivan 1999, 133). However, while Coup-
proofing identifies factors that make a government more susceptible to military intervention and 
addresses ways of preventing it, the concept has limited scope. Quinlivan’s study describes the 
tactics of political leaders for increasing state control over the military in Iraq, Syria, and Saudi 
Arabia, but all of these examples focus specifically on dynamics within authoritarian regimes. 
Much of the scholarly work on “coup-proofing” analyzes how authoritarian governments stay in 
power by containing the military, but it provides fewer analyses about establishing civilian-
supremacy in fledgling democracies. The methods referred to in this concept, “creation of an 
armed force parallel to the military,” the “development of multiple internal security agencies,” or 
“exploitation of... loyalties for coup-critical positions,” (Quinlivan 1999, 133) are tactics for 
increasing authoritarian control, not for consolidating a democracy. These have little use in new 
democracies attempting to preempt a slide into authoritarianism and scholars studying this idea 
have pointed out its limited applicability (Pilster 2012).  
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 Cultural explanations about military intervention have focused on the values of military 
officers that shape their motivations. Some scholars in this line of thinking have identified a large 
flaw inherent to many theories about military intervention. Theories based on an opportunistic 
military in search of political power risk oversimplifying the motivations that drive behavior of 
military actors. Eric Nordlinger makes the following point about the interests of military officers 
who had participated in a coup: “Only a small proportion originally entered the military in the 
hope of attaining governmental offices. Many praetorians took up the reins of government with 
little enthusiasm. Most of them would probably have much preferred to remain in the barracks if 
their objectives, particularly the defense or enhancement of the military’s corporate interests, 
could have been realized from that vantage point” (Nordlinger 1977:142). Rather than being 
motivated by all kinds of political power, many military leaders are more likely to be interested 
in a more specific set of political issues. Policies that pertain to national security and the internal 
organization of the military, for example, have greater relevance to most leaders in a military 
tradition. In militaries with a high esprit de corps and a strong corporate interest, officers are 
especially protective of the internal command structure of the military, which forms the basis of 
its effectiveness.8 The analysis of military leaders in this paper will rest on the assumption that 
they are primarily motivated by these factors and will not necessarily seize power as soon as an 
opportunity presents itself in the form of contentious politics. 
 Several rational choice theories further analyze the decisions of military leaders about 
whether to stage a coup at the individual level. Barbara Geddes’ research on authoritarian 
regimes provides a useful framework for understanding officers’ behavior. Her “barracks game” 
models the choices of military officers as they decide whether or not to engage in a coup to 
                                                          
8 See Nordlinger 
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replace the government. In a two-by-two matrix, the majority and minority factions face different 
payouts resulting from the decision to either have a coup or “return to the barracks.” In this way, 
rather than analyzing the behavior of individual officers, this model builds on the assumption 
that strong corporate interests drive their decisions. The model reflects a situation in which large 
factions within the military must coordinate with each other to produce the highest payouts. The 
best outcome for both groups results when they collectively engage in a coup or all return to the 
barracks. Conversely, the lowest payouts result from a half-way committed military. Whether the 
majority faction succeeds in a coup without the minority faction or the minority faction launches 
a failed coup, the integrity of the military is damaged, which is the least desirable outcome 
(Geddes 1999, 126). 
 In group dynamic theories that explain the interaction between civilians and the military, 
the concept of military professionalism appears frequently. It suggests that, by developing a 
professional culture in the military, the civilian government can establish more control over the 
military. With professionalism, officers become less interested in politics as they become more 
narrowly focused on military matters. However, rather than preventing coups from taking place, 
professionalism also could have the opposite effect of increasing the military’s interest in matters 
outside of war (Stepan 1971). Also, with its emphasis on the military, this theory overlooks other 
factors that could be crucial for determining the success of democratic transitions. In particular, it 
disregards the role that civilian actors play in ensuring their success. Recent studies have 
concentrated more heavily on civil society in democratic transitions and have identified this as a 
common weakness of civil-military relations theory (Mietzner 2009; Cottey et al. 2002). As a 
result, group-dynamic explanations of civil-military relations rectify this by analyzing the 
interaction between the military and civilians as the crucial element of the transition process.  
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Examining Indonesian politics through this type of framework, Marcus Mietzner has 
emphasized the importance of civilian politics by incorporating it into his analysis. He makes a 
significant contribution to the literature by describing the impact of the interaction between the 
military and civilians:  
First, and most essentially, key decisions on basic issues of governance – even if they 
seemingly do not relate to military affairs – cannot be analytically separated from the 
arena in which the quality of civilian oversight over the military is negotiated.... The 
collapse of a democratic transition and the return of military rule are more likely to be 
caused by the breakdown of intra-civilian negotiations on broader societal issues than by 
flawed military control systems (Mietzner 2014, 349-50).  
 
As he points out here, the success of a transition to a model based on democratic, civilian control 
over the military clearly depends on the quality of negotiations between the two. According to 
his argument, the interaction manifests itself in an inverse relationship between civilian solidarity 
and intervention by the military. Mietzner’s “intra-civilian conflict” thesis suggests that, as 
civilian parties become more contentious, military interference in politics will increase as it has 
more opportunities to intervene (Mietzner 2009). However, this thesis rests on two problematic 
assumptions. First, it presupposes that the military will always intervene simply because it has an 
opportunity to increase its political power. As previously discussed, this assumption risks 
oversimplifying the core motivations that drive military leaders’ decision-making. Instead of 
identifying points at which the military could intervene, it might be more useful to examine the 
factors that limit the options of military leaders, compelling them to intervene. Second, the 
theory sets as a condition for achieving democratic reform something that inherently contradicts 
the essence of a democracy. It suggests that disagreements between civilian parties will prevent 
military reforms from taking place, implying that a true democracy, one in which parties disagree 
over key policy issues in elections, cannot exist simultaneously with meaningful reforms. For 
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more useful analysis of how democratic transitions succeed, the research must address how to 
achieve stability throughout the process of implementing democratic reforms. 
Drawing inspiration from Mietzner’s work, this paper similarly attempts to analyze the 
interaction between military and civilian leaders. However, it differs in its approach by turning 
the “intra-civilian conflict” thesis on its head. Rather than showing a positive relationship 
between civilian disunity and military power, this paper contends that civilian political 
competition increases the stability of the relationship with military leaders during a transition 
period, thereby decreasing the potential for a military coup that terminates the new government. 
With the existence of multiple competing political parties, civilian leaders become more likely to 
enter into negotiations with military leaders rather than sidelining the military from the reform 
process. Conversely, as military leaders interact with civilian factions that have similar political 
interests, they are less likely to be unrepresented throughout the transition process. While 
military leaders may start out with no interest in civilian politics, they may increasingly see a 
coup their best option in dealing with a strong elected government that is unwilling to make 
concessions. This reflects a decision making process by leaders of the military that balances the 
high costs from a military intervention, such as international criticism, against the cost of civilian 
encroachment into the military through reforms. If a military has the option to protect itself from 
damaging reforms through some lower cost means, such as allowing an allied civilian party to 
halt or change the nature of reforms, it will choose not to have a coup. As a consequence, 
although a long-term objective of a new democracy after a transition should be to establish 
civilian control over the military, the process must take a gradual course in order to prevent a 
direct confrontation. 
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Representing this adjusted model of civilian-military interaction, the table below 
identifies some possible outcomes of the interaction between military officers and civilians. 
Table 1 shows some of the new implications of a revised “intra-civilian conflict” theory by 
building on Mietzner’s description of the interaction between the level of cohesiveness in 
civilian groups and the military. In the table, this interaction is shown as occurring in both 
directions. The level of solidarity among civilian parties affects the stability of the transition, but 
its effect depends in equal part on the level of factionalism in the military. Factionalism is 
considered low if one group becomes dominant enough that it gains a majority of influence in 
decision making processes. Stability is understood as the likelihood of a coup by the military 
occurring. In the top left square of Table 1, a state of single party dominance combined with low 
levels of factionalism in the military results in a confrontation between the military and a civilian 
government unwilling to compromise with it because of its dominant majority. This represents 
the most unstable situation. The lower left square represents the interaction between low 
factionalism in the military and high levels of civilian partisan competition. The lack of a single 
dominant party creates a more stable situation, though with less meaningful reform, as a weak 
civilian government faces a more cohesive military organization. The lower right square 
represents the most stable and desirable outcome, in which civilian parties become more likely to 
negotiate and form alliances with factions in the military to pass reform agendas. This is the most 
desirable combination because a factionalized military with a factionalized government will 
enable some reforms of the military to take place without a high potential for a coup. In this case, 
some military factions may see it as worthwhile to allow limited reforms in order to dislodge a 
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faction of more senior generals from positions of power.9 In the top right square, a dominant 
civilian party in government has much greater flexibility to implement its agenda without 
needing to negotiate with an internally weak military to accomplish its objectives. Initially, this 
outcome appears the most desirable because it allows a new government to follow a hyper-
reformist path, but several problems could arise. A dominant civilian party with a fragmented 
military has the potential result in another authoritarian government unchecked by the military, 
especially in the absence of constitutional checks on power. However, a single dominant party 
will likely interact with the factionalism in the military by driving it down, compelling officers to 
protect their interests against civilian encroachment by forming a united front. 
TABLE 1 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
At its core, this argument rests on the assumption that peaceful political exchanges 
between civilians and the military will take place in a situation of high factionalism, which will 
decrease the likelihood of a military intervention. Instead of confronting the military head on 
with a rapid pace of reforms, which dangerously provokes intervention from the military, 
                                                          
9 In the second chapter, the paper discusses the role played by younger officers in the Indonesian military in 
encouraging reforms that would weaken the entrenched power of senior generals in the territorial command system 
(Koter), thus clearing the way for them to occupy more senior positions (See Chandra and Kamen 2002). 
Dominant party;  
Strong military 
Dominant party; 
Weak military 
Multiple parties 
without a majority; 
Dominant military 
Multiple parties 
without a majority; 
Weak military 
Civilian 
Groups 
Military 
High Factionalism Low Factionalism 
High 
Factionalism 
Low 
Factionalism 
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partisan competition in the civilian government will result in a slower and more stable pace of 
reform. Additionally, the argument assumes that a military will not generally seize political 
power the moment an opportunity presents itself in the form of a fragmented civilian 
government. Instead, the military has other types of political interests, such as its institutional 
autonomy, that figure more prominently into its cost-benefit analysis regarding the decision to 
intervene with force. Because of a reluctance of many military leaders to become negatively 
intertwined in politics and the potentially high cost to popular opinion of the military, a military 
will only resort to a coup after it has exhausted all other options.10 This becomes especially true 
for militaries experiencing high factionalism because the potential costs of launching a coup 
increase with the risk that some factions will defect. On the civilian side, the argument implies 
that negotiations between civilians and the military become much less likely when a single party 
has a majority representation in the government. In this situation, a civilian government has less 
need to form coalitions, either with other parties or the military, to secure its aims. A dominant 
party has no need for building consensus when it holds a majority in government. Consequently, 
although a dominant party may succeed temporarily in implementing a rapid pace of reforms, a 
military with low factionalism will have lower costs associated with the decision to intervene and 
will be more likely to do so when faced with an uncompromising civilian government.  
 This modified argument addresses the stability of the transition and not the overall pace 
of reforms. By reframing the argument in this way, the paper offers up some rather different 
implications from Mietzner’s original theory of intra-civilian conflict. Instead of arguing that low 
                                                          
10 Felipe Aguero makes this point in the context of Latin American militaries. In establishing civilian supremacy 
over the military, he explains that “a military finds it harder to push for non-democratic prerogatives and to resist 
government policies when the government is visibly backed by a wide array of electorally strong political forces...” 
(See Aguero 1995, 236). 
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civilian solidarity leads to military interference, the paper will show that contentious party 
politics may actually have a positive effect on a democratic transition by creating stability and 
preventing a coup from taking place. In transitioning states, a stable relationship between civilian 
leaders and the military ensures the survival of a new democratic system in its early stages when 
it is most vulnerable to intervention by the military. To demonstrate this point, the paper will 
analyze two cases of transitioning state to demonstrate these different effects of factionalism and 
will proceed as follows: In the second chapter, it will examine the changing levels of civilian 
solidarity and military factionalism in Indonesia at the time of the transition from 1998 to 2000. 
In this period, high factionalism in the Indonesian military combined with competitive partisan 
politics to create a more stable relationship between military and civilian leaders. By 2000, the 
relationship began to shift as the military gradually recovered from the shock of the political 
transition and closed its ranks in reaction to reforms targeting the military. As a result, 
factionalism in the military became lower in 2000 while civilian parties remained fragmented, 
keeping the relationship stable, but less productive with reforms. In the third chapter, the paper 
follows Egypt’s political transition from 2011 to 2013. By contrast, Egypt’s military existed in a 
much less fragmented state at the time of the transition and was capable of maintaining a firm 
grip over the initial pace of reforms. It also managed to do this because of the high factionalism 
of Egypt’s political parties, which had not yet become organized enough to lead the reform 
process. However, the large Islamist bloc of Egyptian parties gradually consolidated its control 
over the elected government by 2012, which led to a situation of low factionalism in the 
government with factionalism in the military remaining low. This created a tenuous relationship 
between the government and the military as their interests began to polarize. Consequently, the 
military managed to stage a coup the moment it considered the civilian government to be 
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crossing certain boundaries, ending the period of transition. Table 2 below details potential 
consequences for reform and intervention of each interaction and Table 3 shows graphically how 
Indonesia and Egypt fit into the model of this explanation. 
 
 
 
TABLE 2 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
TABLE 3    
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Government begins 
rapid reform / 
Military intervenes 
Government able to 
reform / Military 
unable to intervene; 
may shift to low 
factionalism 
Government unable 
to reform / Military 
protects interests  
Government 
negotiates reform / 
Military marginally 
protects interests 
Egypt  
(2012-2013) 
 
Egypt (2011) 
Indonesia (2000) 
 
Indonesia  
(1998-1999) 
Civilian 
Groups 
Military 
High Factionalism Low Factionalism 
High 
Factionalism 
Low 
Factionalism 
Civilian 
Groups 
Military 
High Factionalism Low Factionalism 
High 
Factionalism 
Low 
Factionalism 
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These different scenarios reflect contrasting understandings of democracy and its 
purpose. A key difference between democratic governments with high and low factionalism is 
the centralization of political power into one party. This can be understood with the theoretical 
distinction between majoritarian and consensus-based democracies (Lijphart 1999; 2008). In a 
majoritarian system, the political ideology of the majority become the sole consideration of a 
government elected by the majority to represent its interests, often at the expense of minority 
groups. The majoritarian interpretation of democracy has become associated with negative 
outcomes in terms of policy effectiveness and the representativeness of government (Lijphart 
1999). By contrast, consensus-based systems better accommodate heterogeneous societies with 
many conflicting political interests. The model presented in this paper demonstrates the different 
effects of majoritarian and consensus-based approaches to democracy during transition periods. 
The paper will show these differences in Indonesia and Egypt by analyzing evidence of low or 
high factionalism in the government and the military. In both cases, it will be difficult to clearly 
identify when low factionalism exists as opposed to high factionalism. Also, the conclusion that 
alliances existed at various points between military and civilian factions is hard to show 
definitively with the available information from these periods. However, while acknowledging 
this, I will attempt to use qualitative data in surveys and other research to convey a possible and 
likely narrative of the events in Indonesia and Egypt that support the theory presented here. In 
the case of Indonesia, the paper will argue that a high level of factionalism among civilian parties 
prevented any single one from becoming too powerful. In this case, alliance forming between 
civilians and members of the military enabled both groups to achieve their aims without 
experiencing a coup. Following this, the paper will follow Egypt’s transition to show how a 
different path to democracy contributed to lower stability in the process of reforming the 
16 
 
government. Lower factionalism in the Egyptian government and the military contributed to the 
ultimate conflict between the two that ended Egypt’s democracy. In this way, the paper will 
show the importance of divisive, partisan politics in creating a healthy, functioning democracy. 
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II. Democratization in a “Fragmented Society”: Indonesia’s Transition 
 
 
 Indonesia is a country known for its diversity. Historically, it had faced challenges to the 
survival of democracy given the competition between factions in the highly diverse landscape of 
political ideologies, ethnicities, and religions. Of the persistent obstacles to democratic 
consolidation in Indonesia, “the fragmentation of Indonesian society” may be the most 
significant (Said 2006, 218-9). During the New Order, high levels of social fragmentation 
became an integral part of the regime’s strategy for maintaining control. Because the Indonesian 
military presented the greatest threat to President Suharto’s power, this strategy of encouraging 
social divisions was most apparent in the military. As influence and wealth all emanated from the 
source of power in the regime, President Suharto, generals competed with each other during this 
period to gain his favor. Suharto stayed removed from this internal power struggle in the military 
by manipulating the competition between these groups for political influence and corruption 
(Mietzner 2009; Said 2006a; 2006b). This continued until 1997, when an economic crisis and 
social upheaval abruptly and dramatically reduced the popular legitimacy of the regime and 
allowed military factions to form other political alliances to oppose Suharto (Mietzner 2009, 
101). Following Indonesia’s political transition in 1998, however, these divisions within the 
military and society would continue to have ramifications for the interaction between the new 
civilian government and the military. First, rather than preventing democratic change, the 
interactions between factions in the military and society enabled many positive reforms to occur 
while ensuring that the dominant faction in the military did not oppose the new government. 
Second, the alignments between military and civilian factions provided the transition with more 
stability, helping a major conflict between the government and the military to be defused without 
leading a catastrophic intervention by the military. High factionalism in the military and the 
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Indonesian Parliament allowed mutually beneficial arrangements to occur between generals and 
politicians (Said 2006a). In turn, these alliances enabled resolutions that helped to reduce tension 
between the military and the government during the transition.11 
 In July, 1997, the economic downturn became the catalyst for Suharto’s fragile system to 
spiral out of control. Following the rapid inflation of the rupiah, large demonstrations appeared 
in the streets of Jakarta, demanding a change in government. The sudden protests prompted a 
number of different reactions from the military, demonstrating a lack of cohesiveness in the 
military hierarchy regarding how to handle the crisis. In this new environment of instability, 
which worsened until Suharto’s resignation on May 21, 1998, generals no longer needed to 
compete within the constraints of Suharto’s system of promotion.12 With the popular disapproval 
of the regime, various leaders in civil society also became emboldened in their opposition to the 
regime.13 While some generals continued vying for the favor of Suharto, others began reacting to 
the expectation of a possible regime change by showing limited support for the civilian 
opposition and engaging in activities to support the protest movement (See Mietzner 2009). At 
any given time, two major factions in the military opposed each other over the position the 
military should take vis-a-vis the government. The crisis increased the influence of civilian 
parties to the point that Suharto’s government could no longer control politics and the military 
factions could now form alliances with civilians for political leverage. Throughout the first 
                                                          
11 Despite the lack of direct evidence for this, the rest of the chapter will attempt to explain how this may have 
occurred using the available facts from this period. Again, this is an alternative explanation of how the transition 
could have unfolded with drastically different implications for democratic transitions. 
12 Douglas Kammen and Siddhartha Chandra explain that one of the motivations for younger officers especially to 
support a change of power and subsequent reforms was that it could potentially clear the way for further promotions 
by reducing the number of years that senior officers occupied higher posts (See Kammen and Chandra 1999). 
13 Prior to the regime change, the opposition leader Amien Rais created the organization for the Partai Amanat 
Nasional (PAN), or the National Mandate Party. 
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couple years of the transition, arrangement of alliances between civilian groups and the most 
dominant faction in the military would set the course for the transition. 
 In early 1998, the two most influential factions in the military differed on two points: 
one, regarding the role the military should take toward the regime during the unfolding crisis; 
and, two, regarding the particular tactics that should be employed in responding to the crisis. The 
first faction consisted of some of many of the more reform oriented officers who disapproved of 
the heavy involvement of officers in civilian government, which they viewed as inherently 
damaging the integrity of the military (See Mietzner 2007, 106). These generals preferred to 
approach the crisis cautiously, providing security during the protests without using physical 
violence. While this first faction is characterized as reformist, many of the generals in this 
faction still had very conservative views about the role of the military in Indonesian society. 
These generals for the most part favored only limited reforms on the military following a regime 
change. Conversely, the second faction of generals favored a more reactionary approach, 
resorting to repressive tactics to keep the regime in power and rejected any proposal of reform 
(Cohen 1998). The reformers, following the lead of General Wiranto, the Army Chief of Staff in 
the late 1990s, consisted of generals with a range of different attitudes about the institutional role 
of the military vis-a-vis society. While Wiranto himself appeared reluctant to embrace the 
prospect of replacing Suharto prior to the transition, a group in the younger generation of officers 
with much more radical views on reform aligned themselves with this faction (Mietzner 2009). 
In this way, older, moderate officers and the younger, more radical officers in the military 
formed an alliance based on their mutual interest in a regime change.  
 Opposing the reformers at the opposite end of the spectrum were the conservative 
officers. While political stances within this faction varied, officers in this groups generally 
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opposed any type of reform and stood behind the regime. Led by General Prabowo Subiyanto, a 
fast rising officer in Kopasus14, the Indonesian military’s Special Forces branch, the 
conservatives were united in their more traditional stance regarding the role of the military in 
society, favoring the New Order paradigm of the military “leading society from the front.”15 
Unlike the moderate group of officers in the reformer faction, the conservatives supported the 
traditional role of the military as a so-called “functional group” or participant party in Indonesian 
politics.16 This term, originating from the Guided Democracy era of civil-military relations, 
suggests that the military should take an active role in everyday governance and policy making.  
 In addition to their different attitudes toward the regime, the two military factions 
differed in terms of their relationships with civilians and how they chose to handle the ensuing 
crisis. While Wiranto favored a more cautious approach, Prabowo argued for harsh actions to be 
taken to quickly repress the street demonstrations and restore order. However, once the crisis had 
reached a point that it appeared likely a transition would soon take place, both sides more 
aggressively sought support from civilian groups to improve their political position following the 
inevitable regime change. Wiranto offered protection to important civilian opposition figures and 
ordered security for peaceful protests. Prabowo, on the other hand, made attempts to gain the 
allegiance of conservative Muslims in Java.17 General Agus Wirahadikusumah explained this 
competition for support from civilians, stating, “in the past, an officer had to suck up to Suharto 
to get promoted and have influence, but now it is much more complicated... the politicians must 
like you, the media must like you, only then you’re a winner.”18 Civilian leaders appeared 
                                                          
14 Special Forces Command (Indonesian: Komando Pasukan Khusus).  
15 Paradigma Baru, 1999, "Markas Besar Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia," ABRI Abad XXI. 
16 The term “functional group” (Ind. Golongan Karya) 
17 Republika, “Umat Islam dan ABRI harus Bersatu,” Republika, 26 January, 1998; See Mietzner 2009, 114. 
18 This is taken from an interview by Mietzner with Wirahadikusumah, Makassar, 23 February 2000 (See Mietzner 
2009, 214). 
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similarly anxious to secure alliances with the generals. Civilian leaders were familiar with the 
internal rivalries of the military and recognized the benefits of aligning with certain factions in 
order to advance their political agendas. Previously during the New Order, the media had 
regularly exposed the political attitudes of generals to the public and helped to shine light on 
much of the internal politics of the military, which at fed into Suharto’s strategy of manipulating 
military rivalries (Said 2006, 216). As a consequence, civilian politicians became acutely aware 
of the factionalism in the military and sought alliances with the factions that shared their political 
interests.19 For example, the opposition leader Amien Rais, who created the National Mandate 
Party (PAN),20 communicated in secret with General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, a member of 
the reformer faction, about increasing public criticisms of President Suharto.21 Throughout the 
transition, civilian leaders and generals sought each other’s support to advance their political 
interests.  
Civilian parties could be broken down into three major social followings, the secular-
nationalist groups, Muslim organizations, and student groups. Prior to the spring of 1998, 
secular-nationalist political leaders had already begun to voice their criticism of the regime. The 
government sanctioned opposition party, PDI-P,22 had led the way in organizing protests against 
the regime after Megawati Sukarnoputri had been removed from her position as its leader. This 
was one of the earliest manifestations of a conflict between civilian groups and the regime as 
Megawati had been openly challenging the control of Golkar, the government’s party, over the 
                                                          
19 In an interview with Marcus Mietzner, Jakarta, 18 October 1999, Abdurrahman Wahid stated, “you still can’t 
become president in Indonesia without the military... they’re still strong, and that’s why I will seek to get Wiranto’s 
support to become the president.” (See Mietzner 2009, 205). 
20 Partai Amanat Nasional. 
21 Amien Rais, “Kassospol Minta Amien Tetap Kritis,” Jawa Pos, 10 May, 1999, taken from notes in Mietzner 
2009, 139. 
22 Partai Demokrasi Indonesia – Perjuangan (Indonesian Democratic Party – Struggle). 
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elections. By contrast, the two primary Muslim organizations, NU23 and Muhammadiyah, were 
relatively divided in this period over their position toward the regime and the two military 
factions. In fact, the future president and leader of NU, Abdurrahman Wahid, avoided taking 
sides until very late (Mietzner 2009, 155), which may have weakened his ability to form 
effective political alliances with the important generals during his later presidency. Until he 
finally committed to cooperating with leaders such as Megawati and Amien Rais to call for 
Suharto’s resignation, he remained ambivalent. In December, 1997, he explained the relationship 
to a senior general, saying, “We work together, we have a similar vision.” When pressed about 
the existence of an alliance, he replied, “No, we have no formal alliance,” to which the general 
responded that the military would have “crushed it” if they had.24 Student groups gained the most 
media coverage of the civilian groups opposing the regime by staging protests. While the student 
groups had no experienced leaders to represent their vision of a democratic transition in formal 
negotiations, they nevertheless created the most uproar, drawing attention internationally and 
forcing party leaders to take a stance on the regime.  
 Because of the divisions between the civilian groups, several different alliances emerged 
between the military and civilians. As the reformers in the military anticipated the eventual fall 
of Suharto, they began to communicate with civilian leaders about how the transition would take 
place. Some of the younger generation of officers took an even more active role in speaking out 
publicly about reform. Officers from the graduating class of 1973, including General Agus 
Wirahadikusumah, published a book of essays after Suharto’s abdication about the new direction 
                                                          
23 Nahdlatul Ulama. 
24 This comes from an interview by Greg Barton in 2002. See Greg Barton, 2002, Abdurrahman Wahid: Muslim 
Democrat, Indonesian President, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press), 229. 
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for the TNI25 outside of politics (Wirahadikusumah et al. 1999). Behind the scenes, other officers 
sought to work directly with civilian leaders to bring about the transition. Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono, also a member of the class of 1973, even encouraged leaders of secular-nationalist 
parties to continue their attacks on Suharto in his communique with Amien Rais (Rais 1999)26. 
Wiranto himself vocalized support for Wahid and other civilian leaders to prevent them from 
aligning with conservative generals. For his part, Prabowo belonged to the group of “green 
generals” that sought the support of more traditional members of the Muslim organizations. Prior 
to the transition, several of the more conservative Muslim organizations remained supportive of 
the Suharto regime and were supportive of harsher actions taken against the protesters (Barton 
2002, 229).  
The alliances between the reformers in the military and the civilian groups during the 
transition would set the stage for the subsequent period of reform. After President Suharto finally 
resigned on 18 May, his vice president, B.J. Habibie, began coordinating with the moderate 
reformers in the military to initiate a gradual process of reform that insulated the military from 
too much meddling. From the start of his office as acting president, Habibie responded to 
popular pressure to implement sweeping reforms in a number of areas. Censorship of the media 
was eliminated with the creation of a free press, a rather large number of new political parties 
were sanctioned, and elections for national legislative bodies, the DPR and MPR, were reformed 
to allow proportional representation. Furthermore, the powers of the DPR gradually increased in 
terms of its ability to implement reforms without the explicit direction of the executive 
                                                          
25 The TNI (Indonesian National Army, Tentara Nasional Indonesia) became the new umbrella organization over 
the combined armed forces of the military following the elimination of ABRI. This was the original name of the 
Indonesian military prior to Indonesian independence. 
26 This communication between Rais and SBY was reported in the Jawa Pos on 10 May 1999. See Notes in 
Mietzner 2009, 139. 
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(Ziegenhain 2008). On the other hand, reforms in the military, one of the most demanded areas 
of change, seemed to be occurring slowly. As a known ally of Wiranto’s faction, Habibie 
discussed with his chief of staff how reforms would take place in the military under the internal 
supervision of the generals. Habibie allowed Wiranto to oversee reforms internally so as to 
protect its institutional integrity from civilian encroachment.27 This arrangement satisfied the 
goals of Wiranto’s faction by allowing only limited reforms under their control while 
simultaneously ending the invasive politics of the Suharto regime. Subsequently, the military 
announced a doctrinal shift with the “Four New Paradigms,” based on a draft proposal written by 
SBY prior to the transition, proposing a new role for the military with only an advisory role in 
politics.28 Although reform occurred slowly and left many civilian reformers dissatisfied, it 
nevertheless marked a major improvement over the state of affairs in the New Order. As a result 
of the negotiated transfer of power from the military to a civilian-led government, an open 
dialogue between the civilian government and the dominant faction in the military created a 
gradual process of reforms. The military, which still held the power to reverse all progress, 
appeared temporarily committed to its alliance with civilian leaders in reforming the 
government. 
Nearing the elections of 1999, alliances between factions in the military and civilian 
parties shifted as the political scene changed. Habibie’s alliance with Wiranto weakened as his 
popularity waned due to his association with the regime.29 By contrast, several of the Muslim 
organizations had begun to perform well in the polls with the NU’s political party, the PKB, 
                                                          
27 Habibie proposed that the internal problems of the military should be left to the discretion of the general’s in a 
statement on 23 June 1998 in “Pangab: ABRI Harus Mereformasi Diri,” Kompas, 24 June 1998 (See Note 10 in 
Mietzner 2009, 244). 
28 The new paradigms were also mentioned in a speech by Wiranto in March, 1999 (See Wiranto, 1999, “Paradigma 
Baru ABRI,” Kompas, March 9, 1999). 
29 Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (The National Awakening Party). 
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securing the most votes. The well-known leader of the NU, Abdurrahman Wahid, became the 
forerunner in the presidential race ahead of President Habibie. At first, Wiranto had been aligned 
with Habibie out of political convenience because of they had both been connected to the 
previous regime. However, because of Habibie’s weakening position in the polls, Wiranto 
realigned himself with the PKB in an agreement with Wahid that guaranteed him a position in 
the new cabinet. As a result, Wahid temporarily acquired the support of Wiranto’s dominant 
faction in the military prior to his inauguration in October, 1999, giving him the backing he 
needed from the military to win the election. However, this political arrangement changed 
immediately after the election when Wahid abruptly turned against Wiranto and his inner circle 
of senior generals.30 After taking the cabinet position, Wiranto was subjected an investigation 
following allegations of his involvement in human rights violations in East Timor. Meanwhile, 
Wahid alienated Wiranto from his staff and, during with the investigation, Wahid appalled the 
other generals of Wiranto’s faction by revealing his plans of introducing extensive reforms 
directed at the military. In addition to Wiranto’s personal humiliation, Wahid justified the new 
reform agenda by publicly portraying the military as a hold-over from the regime that would 
require major restructuring. These actions by the presidency broke Wahid’s alliance with the 
dominant faction of the military on bad terms. 
To pass his reforms, Wahid realigned himself with the more radical segment of Wiranto’s 
faction, consisting of younger officers who supported more radical reform. This smaller faction 
of radical reforms favored a restructuring of the military, which would allow them to dislodge 
                                                          
30 After entering office, Wahid took “measures to exert civilian control over the military and rein in the Army” by 
sacking the majority of the senior officers (See The Editors 2000, 126). Furthermore, he reduced their influence in 
the civilian government by alienating senior officers from the presidential palace (See McBeth 2000). 
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the more senior, conservative officers from their entrenched positions in the command posts.31 In 
their study of the 1998 regime change, Douglas Kammen and Siddhartha Chandra indicate that 
the earlier policies had enabled the rapid rise of an older generation of officers to occupy long-
term posts in the regional command system.32 Their analysis shows that reformer officers in the 
graduation class of 1973 were disadvantaged before the transition by the older generation of 
officers and would benefit from promotions with new policies directed at reforming the 
command structure (Kammen and Chandra 2002). After removing Wiranto from his position, 
Wahid selected officers from this group of younger officers to replace more conservative officers 
in other important command positions. Most notably, he appointed army general Agus 
Wirahadikusumah, who had drawn attention for his reformist credentials with his published 
essays addressing several important areas of military reform,33 to become the new commander of 
Kostrad.34 This decision appalled more senior officers in the military as the position had 
traditionally been filled by senior in line for the positions of army chief of staff and ABRI chief. 
To the newly created position of TNI Chief,35 he appointed Admiral Widodo, a naval officer also 
known for having reformist attitudes. Since the transition, Wirahadikusumah in particular had 
taken a more active role in speaking out about military reform, appearing in front of the press to 
make incendiary statements about the “feudalistic” structure of the military (Said 2006). Older 
officers in both the conservative and reformer factions looked disdainfully on this behavior as 
going against the better interests of the entire military to serve individual political ambitions. 
                                                          
31 The majority of officers opposed removing the territorial command system because of the impact it would have on 
the off-budget revenue of the military. Thus, the more senior officers tied to Wiranto who occupied these position 
were in opposition to the younger, reform-oriented officers. (See Aribowo 2003, 117) 
32 Komando Teritorial (Koter). 
33 Referring to Wirahadikusumah et al, Indonesia Baru dan Tantangan TNI: Pemikiran Masa Depan, Jakarta: 
Pustaka Sinara Harapan, 1999, mentioned earlier on page 20. 
34 Komando Cadangan Strategis Angkatan Darat (Army Strategic Reform Command). 
35 The official name of the Indonesian military had been recently changed from ABRI to TNI (Tentara Nasional 
Indonesia). 
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Wahid had hoped to work with Wirahadikusumah to reform the military’s regional command 
structure, the Koter36 system, which had enabled the more traditional officers in the military to 
continue directly influencing regional politics. However, these reform goals proved too 
ambitious as they conflicted with the interests of the majority of the more influential officers. 
Consequently, the two major factions in the military by this point became the much more 
influential conservative officers, opposed to Wahid’s reforms, and the weaker faction of young, 
radical reformers allied to Wahid. 
By aligning himself with the faction of radical reformers, Wahid hoped he could establish 
control over the military to advance his reform agenda. However, with this strategy, he 
underestimated the effect that such aggressive reforms would have on the allegiances of the 
majority of officers. Wahid’s political maneuvering antagonized a large portion of military 
officers led by Wiranto that had originally supported the new government. By appointing 
Wirahadikusumah, Wahid violated several precedents, bypassing several more senior officers in 
line for the post and by attempting to impose the types of reforms traditionally managed by the 
military’s leadership internally. Through this series of miscalculations, Wahid exceeded the 
bounds of what was manageable in exploiting the factionalism in the military and unintentionally 
drove factionalism in the military down as the majority of the officers sided with the 
conservative faction in the military in opposition to the tactics of the Wahid Presidency. As many 
of the officers in Wiranto’s circle felt excluded from the administration, they aligned more 
closely with the conservative camp. Wahid’s greatest blunder in aligning with the faction of 
radical reformers was in driving away the support of all of the more senior and influential 
officers who had the power to control a large faction in the military. 
                                                          
36 Komando Teritorial (Military Territorial Command). 
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Meanwhile, the Wahid Presidency struggled to follow through with many of its 
aggressive reform policies because he lacked a strong coalition. As time passed since Wahid’s 
inauguration, his behavior in the presidency had gradually damaged the allegiance key political 
figures in other major parties in parliament. Although Wahid had won a considerable victory in 
the presidential election against Habibie, he had done so with a tenuous coalition built from a 
large number of political parties. The most important political parties with representation in 
parliament were made up of a number of other small Muslim parties, several liberal nationalist 
parties, and the military’s party, Golkar. To succeed in pushing his ambitious platform of 
reforms through the parliament, he required supporters from several of the other parties with 
large numbers of seats. Wahid had begun his presidency with a coalition between his own party 
and the largest of the liberal nationalist parties, the PDI-P, which was led by the charismatic 
political figure, Megawati Sukarnoputri. This alliance with the PDI-P and several other parties 
had bolstered his election campaign with Megawati as his running mate, but the relationship 
began to turn sour almost immediately after his election through a series of major disagreements. 
Wahid alarmed other members of his coalition by showing little restraint in issuing 
controversial directives and sacking important political figures. Soon after removing General 
Wiranto from his cabinet position in 2000, he sacked several other members of his cabinet who 
had disagreed over certain policy decisions. Additionally, around the same time period, the 
president became embroiled in a scandal over corruption charges against several of his cabinet 
members, which implicated him as well (Barton 2002). Initially, Megawati remained supportive 
of the president’s reform agenda, but also came into conflict with the president when he excluded 
her from a number of key decisions and cabinet meetings. In March 2000, after Wahid had 
sacked two more members of his cabinet who had been calling for his resignation, Megawati 
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herself began withdrawing herself from the president and aligning with the opposition in the 
parliament (Mietzner 2009; Barton 2002). Because of his reportedly high emotionality and his 
disregard for the advice of his cabinet members, he began pushing key political allies away and 
breaking up his coalition. Gradually, as he sensed a withdrawal of support from other civilian 
leaders, Wahid’s behavior became more defensive and erratic. 
By the spring of 2000, disagreements between Wahid and a number of other party 
members led to open discussions in parliament about the possibility of impeachment. Because of 
the newness of the democratic system, impeachment was as yet unprecedented in the Indonesian 
government. The process for going forward with it seemed vague, yet the constitution clearly 
contained an impeachment clause. This allowed members of parliament to threaten the president 
with it if he continued to exclude other groups from the policy making process. In April, instead 
of directly calling for impeachment, the opposition leader Amien Rais led the parliament in a 
vote for an official reprimand to the president for exceeding the constitutional powers of his 
office. Then, Wahid responded with even more alarming behavior by implicitly threatening to 
call on his supporter base in the NU to coerce the other parties in parliament into submission by 
marching on Jakarta. Around the time of the vote, a group of 20,000 NU members organized in 
Surabaya and announced that it would come to Jakarta in support of the president against the 
insubordinate parliament, stating that they were “ready to die” for the president (Barton 2002, 
355). While other cabinet members assured the press that President Wahid was trying everything 
to contain the grass roots movement, this conflicted with Wahid’s tendency of repeated referring 
to his supporters in press conferences in what seemed to be thinly veiled threats of violence. On 
the day that parliament voted on the reprimand, Wahid simultaneously issued a public statement, 
in which he remarked that he had 400,000 supporters “ready to descend upon Jakarta” (Jakarta 
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Post, 30, April, 2000; Barton 2002). Making matters worse, the president continued his struggle 
to gain stronger control over the military and the police by sacking General Bimantoro from the 
post of Chief of National Police when he refused Wahid’s orders to place military personnel at 
the parliament. In response to these activities, the head of Golkar in Parliament, General Akbar 
Tandjung, finally called on the floor for a motion on April 30 for a special MPR session for 
impeachment to be held on August 1. 
In July, the conflict reached its peak as it became clear to Wahid that he was losing 
support from the most powerful factions in the military as well as the major civilian factions. He 
continued issuing threats against parliament, deliberately timing them with the hearings, and 
ultimately declared he would freeze parliament on July 20 to prevent it from continuing with the 
impeachment process. In an attempt to carry out this threat, he attempted to appoint one of his 
allies in the military to become the new chief of police even though Bimantoro had refused to 
vacate the position and issued orders to military commanders. However, Wahid’s absolutist 
handling of political power and his attacks on the military had reduced his influence in both 
parliament and the military and his orders to the military commanders were simply ignored. On 
July 20, as thousands of NU members began to congregate outside of Jakarta as a show of 
support for their leader, Amien Rais called for a flash session of the MPR to hold the 
impeachment proceedings in advance of the August 1 date. The decision coincided with sudden 
deployment of 40,000 troops around the capital, demonstrating the support of key military 
leaders for parliament and the level of coordination that must have taken place between them. 
Columns of tanks were deployed around the presidential palace, facing inward toward the palace 
to avoid the impression they were protecting it, and the heaviest security was concentrated 
around the parliament building to give security to the proceedings. If not for the fact that a 
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constitutionally legitimate impeachment process was taking place inside, the military’s sudden 
activity could easily have been interpreted as a coup. Had the civilian groups in parliament not 
been seeking to remove the president through institutional means, the military’s limited 
intervention might have become a coup. 
The impeachment proceedings in the MPR session on July 26 revealed the extent of the 
factionalism in the parliament that had prevented Wahid from consolidating a strong power base. 
The parties opposed to the Wahid Presidency were the majority in parliament and became 
aligned with conservative officers in the military with the goal of removing Wahid. The largest 
bloc in parliament was led by the PDI-P, which had the most seats, as well as the National 
Mandate Party37 (PAN), led by Amien Rais. Although Golkar38 had become less popular 
following the collapse of the regime, it nevertheless continued to control a significant number of 
seats in Parliament so it too influenced the outcome of the vote against Wahid. While still 
serving as the vice president, Megawati ensured that the PDI-P and many of her allies in the 
military sided against the president. General Akbar Tandjung, the leader of Golkar in parliament, 
belonged to the faction of conservative generals and helped coordinate the impeachment voting 
process with Rais as well as the head of the PDI-P, Arifin Panigoro. Once Panigoro called the 
floor to vote on 20 July, the civilian factions in parliament had already decided along with allies 
in the military to act against the president and voted almost unanimously with 90% in favor of 
impeachment, those abstaining being from Wahid’s own party, PKB (Barton 2002, 360). 
As evidenced by the impeachment process of President Wahid, coalition building 
between factions in the military and the government had a direct bearing on the outcome of 
                                                          
37 Partai Amanat Nasional. 
38 Golkar is the regime party under Suharto and continued as the military’s party in parliament after Suharto’s 
resignation. 
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Indonesia’s transition to democracy by preventing a coup. The effects of the factionalism in the 
military and the government were threefold: first, they determined the overall pace of reforms, 
which depended on the types of alliances created between civilians and military officers; second, 
they determined how successfully reforms would be implemented, depending on how much 
support they received from the military; and, thirdly, these interactions determined the overall 
stability of the transition. Despite the challenges associated with reforming a military, an 
inclusive relationship with the dominant faction in the military will allow the government to 
more successfully pursue a range of reforms with the support of the generals. Most importantly, 
this relationship also ensures that the military will not have a coup as long as the relationship 
enables the military’s own interests to be protected. For this to be realized, the civilian political 
landscape cannot be dominated by one group, but must present alternative options of alliances 
for the military if the existing one fails.. Although disagreements in a state of high factionalism 
prevent rapid reform from taking place in the civilian government, alliances between civilians 
and military officers reduces conflict by making resolutions possible between factions on both 
sides. As a model of “coup-proofing,” the constant negotiations that occurred between civilian 
groups and military factions in the Indonesian case enabled its democracy to survive the early 
stages of the transition. In spite of the negative impact on the speed of reforms, a negotiated 
reform agenda by a civil-military alliance is necessary to prevent a military intervention. After 
Indonesia’s government became a democracy in 1999, it has continued along the track of 
democratization without a relapse to authoritarianism and is one of the few Southeast Asian 
nations to successfully consolidate its democracy. 
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III. “Tyranny of the Multitude”: Egypt’s Experiment with Democracy 
 
 
 In December, 2010, a series of protests against the Tunisian regime set off a chain 
reaction of political protests targeting authoritarian regimes throughout the region. Inspired by 
events in Tunisia, Egyptian crowds rapidly organized in Cairo in January, 2011, to protest the 
long-standing Mubarak regime. Following an unexpectedly quick victory for the protesters in 
Tahrir Square, an interim government was established and Egypt subsequently witnessed its first 
free election in over sixty years. With more than 84 million people (CIA World Factbook 2014), 
Egypt has the largest population in the Middle East and, like Indonesia, it contains an extremely 
diverse society. If the tide of democratization brought by the Arab Spring was to succeed in 
Egypt, it would need to overcome the serious disagreements found between the major political 
actors. Over the course of the next two and a half years, Egypt’s democratic transition quickly 
became mired in the historical divisions of Egyptian society and tragically ended early. Why did 
Egypt fail to achieve consensus in its new, elected government and consolidate its democracy? 
What factors drove the military to intervene in the summer of 2013? During the period following 
Egypt’s January Revolution, certain aspects of its social divisions contributed to the unresolvable 
tensions that eventually ended in conflict with an intervention by the military. These include the 
low factionalism in the elected government after 2011 with a single dominant civilian faction, a 
weak institutional framework for ensuring consensus in the new government, and low 
factionalism in the military, which enabled it to take action against the civilian government. 
 From the start of the protests in January, 2011, the military found itself in a difficult 
position. While it had a close association with the regime – the last three presidents had all come 
directly from military service – it had been largely sidelined from a central role in politics by 
President Mubarak in recent years. As part of his strategy to reduce the threat of the military to 
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his power, Mubarak maintained strong central control over the military without incorporating the 
military into the political structure. Senior generals and top ministers received appointments by 
the president, but generals did not take an active part in running the state (Ivekovic 2013, 174), 
as they did in Indonesia. The effects of this were two-fold: first, the Egyptian military had not 
undergone a process of politicization that commonly occurs in military regimes, preventing 
political divisions and keeping factionalism low; second, the fates of the generals were not 
clearly intertwined with the regime as they had been in Indonesia, leaving it freer to form new 
alliances. Thus, the allegiances of the military were not clear at the time of the revolution. At an 
earlier point in history, Egypt’s government could have been categorized as a military regime,39 
but the military alignment had shifted away from the regime because of disagreements over 
divergent interests. Mubarak’s policy of economic liberalization had begun to threaten the 
military’s control over parts of the economy it directly managed. While the exact proportion of 
the economy controlled by the military is unknown, it directly manages the military industrial 
complex as well as several food-stuff industries (Ivekovic 2013, 176). Unlike Indonesia, the 
Egyptian military’s control over these industries was well documented, making them easily 
targeted by the civilian government for reforms (Mietzner 2014). Because of its weakened 
association with the regime and the threat to its fiscal interests, the military had incentives to 
withdraw itself at the moment of the crisis. 
During the crisis, the military had developed a popular public image among the protesters 
as an organization distinct from the Mubarak regime. The military increasingly became seen as a 
third party in the contest between protesters and the Mubarak regime that could guarantee the 
                                                          
39 In a study on authoritarian regime breakdown, Barbara Geddes created an exhaustive dataset of authoritarian 
regimes according to a typology consisting of military regimes, personalist regimes, party regimes, and mixed 
regimes. (See Geddes 1999, 121-2) 
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success of either side if it was won over. A commonly heard chant of protesters in Tahrir Square 
was “the army and the people are one hand” (Tschirgi et al. 2013; El-Bendary 2013). During the 
uprisings, the commander of SCAF40 during the January Revolution, Field Marshal Hussein 
Tantawi, very carefully exercised restraint in regard to the protests. Although the military at first 
refrained from intervening to protect the protesters from the armed bands of state security, the 
regime’s internal security force, it eventually deployed troops on the streets to protect the 
protesters as it became more apparent that the regime was going to fall. With the writing on the 
wall, President Mubarak finally resigned on February 11, 2011, despite his earlier refusal to do 
so. The timing of the resignation suggested that the military’s ambivalence about the regime had 
a great deal to do with his sudden change in stance.  
After Mubarak’s resignation, Egypt entered a period of careful negotiations between 
civilian groups and the military over the terms of the political transition. With strong institutional 
integrity, the military was able to maintain control over the pace of reforms during the initial 
period. The head of SCAF, Field Marshal Hussein Tantawi, immediately began a process of 
“national dialogue” meant to breach the gap separating the military from various political groups 
(Fahmy 2011). From the start, the military leadership faced serious difficulties in negotiating 
with civilian groups as it remained unclear who the representative leaders were. No single leader 
could claim to represent a majority of the groups involved in protesting the regime. Under the 
regime, only a small number of parties in the “tolerated opposition” had been allowed to exist 
within the official system, but these groups were hardly representative of the newly emergent 
student groups that led the protests. The political parties during the Mubarak regime had served 
no other purpose than to create legitimacy for the state (Blaydes 2008). To find civilian political 
                                                          
40 Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. 
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allies that could be reliably controlled by the military, Tantawi turned to one of the only civilian 
parties not directly associated with the regime, the Wafd Party, to find representatives for an 
interim government. SCAF picked three Wafd Party members, one of which was a Coptic 
Christian, to fill cabinet positions (Ivekovic 2013, 184). However, this strategy failed because it 
excluded the new civilian political organizations that had a stake in the January Revolution. This 
worsened the image of the military by aligning it with a weaker civilian faction that had been 
associated with the old regime.41 
At this time, civilian political organizations spanned a wide array of overlapping and 
conflicting ideologies. In the suddenness of the January protests, the various groups had not had 
enough time to coalesce into effective party structures, but the groups could be broadly 
conceived of as belonging to two blocs representing different political interests (Tschirgi et al. 
2013, 5). In the first bloc were the Islamist organizations, consisting mainly of the Muslim 
Brotherhood and the Salafists42. Because of its historical opposition to the regime, the Muslim 
Brotherhood had long experience functioning outside of the formal political system and the 
community networks through mosques gave the Islamist bloc a strong, integrated support base. It 
quickly would emerge as the most effectively-run organization in post-Mubarak Egypt. The 
second bloc, the secular-liberal political organizations, consisted mainly of students and urban 
intellectuals. A few of the student organizations had been organizing in the years leading up to 
the January Revolution, but even these were much less developed than the Islamist groups. A 
large number of small student groups participated together in the protests, but had no clearly 
                                                          
41 This decision by SCAF to appoint members of the Wafd Party drew criticisms from many other civilian groups. 
Statements from SCAF discouraging “attempts to pounce on power” prompted the new student protests in Tahrir 
Square in July (See Amira Howeidy, 2012, “Unfinished business: timeline of a revolutionary year,” Al-Ahram 
Weekly Online, 1 February, 2012). 
42 The Salafis were a religious sect following an orthodox interpretation of Islam popular in rural regions of Egypt. 
The following did not have a political organization as strong as the Muslim Brotherhood, but its members 
overwhelmingly favored the Brotherhood’s platform for establishing an Islamic state. 
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defined set of aims beside the removal of the Mubarak government. Several other liberal parties 
emerged during this period of the transition, but these were so numerous and uncoordinated that 
an effective liberal coalition could not form.43 In opposition to both the Islamist and secular-
liberal blocs were the “secular-conservatives,” the remnants of the old regime that consisted 
mainly of the oligarchic elite with strong economic ties to the Mubarak’s presidency. These were 
led by the National Democratic Party (NDP), which had been the main party structure of the 
Mubarak regime.  
The student groups of the secular-liberal bloc were the newest and least established 
without a strong party to unite them.44 These organizations emerged as a response to the 
economic situation in Egypt at the time of the revolution. In spite of the rapid growth in the 
economy, unemployment had steadily increased during the early 2000s due to the concentration 
of economic power among those with connections to the regime. Simultaneously, a rapid 
increase in the number of people with secondary and tertiary education had resulted in a growing 
number of educated young people who could not find work during the 1990s and 2000s 
(Ivekovic 2013, 177). Consequently, by 2011, 90% of unemployed Egyptians belonged to the 
age cohort younger than 25, creating conditions for political activism among the youth (El 
Bendary 2013, 5). This urban, educated segment of society began agitating for economic reform 
and the liberalization of the political system during the 2000s, culminating in the “bread riots” of 
April, 2008, which concentrated on the issue of the growing income disparity between the 
                                                          
43 The secular liberal bloc consisted of a hodge-podge of parties aside from the student-led groups and were 
extremely numerous. They included the Popular Democratic Party, the Free Egyptians Party, the Egyptian Green 
Party, the Democratic Union Party, the Party of Social Solidarity, and many others (See Mohamed Abdel-Baky, 
“Liberal Uncertainty,” al-Ahram Weekly, May 5-11, 2011). During the parliamentary elections, the Brotherhood’s 
political arm, the Freedom and Justice Party, as well as the Salfist Al-Nour Party would each win the largest number 
of seats. 
44 A large number of student groups, such as the April 6 Movement, tried to gain the most influence, but failed to 
secure a large following (See Mohamed Abdel-Baky, “Liberal Uncertainty,” Al-Ahram Weekly, May 5, 2011). 
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conservative oligarchy and the younger generation of Egyptians. By the time of the January 
Revolution, this bloc could be most clearly identified by its preoccupation with economic reform 
and it primarily attracted students, intellectuals, and some of the urban poor.45 However, these 
groups remained disorganized and highly fragmented by the time of the revolution. The ad hoc 
nature of the political movements meant that they spanned a number of unclear and conflicting 
political agendas. While the student bloc would field several different parties to compete in the 
elections, they never became cohesive enough in their structure to compete with the very 
solidary Islamist bloc. 
Following the transition, the largest and most well organized group that had been 
involved in the uprising was the Muslim Brotherhood. By contrast to the student groups, the 
Muslim Brothers had emerged from decades of experience running their organization outside of 
the regime-sanctioned system and had continued to function effectively despite periodic 
crackdowns. Because of the strong network that existed through Muslim communities, the 
“uneven political liberalization under Sadat and Mubarak created a political system with a 
hollow core and a dynamic periphery,” (Wickham 2002) which resulted in a comparatively 
strong Muslim political organization. This posed a dilemma for the military junta led by General 
Tantawi as it was reluctant to negotiate with a group that it had historically opposed. However, 
the effective organization of the Brotherhood and its ability to acquire a following in many of the 
rural areas in Egypt enabled it to become a dominant voice in the process of creating the new 
government. It controlled a large volunteer structure through its network of mosques and had 
access to a vast line of financial support that extended beyond Egypt’s borders. Because the 
                                                          
45 Mohamed Abdel-Baky, “Liberal Uncertainty,” Al-Ahram Weekly, May 5, 2011.  
39 
 
Brotherhood’s Islamic platform also reflected the interests of the other Islamic groups, such as 
the Salafist Movement, it also formed a coalition that could perform well in the later elections. 
In the months after the revolution, the fragmented civilian groups competed with each 
other to gain the favor of the governing military council. However, as time dragged on without 
official plans for an election, a debate began around the timing of the elections and several of the 
student groups continued to protest to pressure the military establish a timeline. The debate 
centered on the issue of whether to hold the parliamentary elections prior to or after drafting a 
new constitution. In favor of holding immediate elections, the student led April 6 Movement 
organized ongoing protests in Tahrir Square against the slow pace of reforms under SCAF. By 
July, 2011, the issue had become highly contested after confrontations with the student groups 
had resulted in several dozen deaths. Though many of the politically moderate groups passively 
supported the cause of the protesters, others supported the military and regarded the protesters as 
agitators creating further disruption, “seeking to sow sedition by driving a wedge between the 
army and the people” (Heba Fahmy 2011). However, during the first part of this period, the 
Muslim Brotherhood had continued a strategy of remaining politically neutral, delaying a 
confrontation with SCAF until it had gained more political leverage. At this time, the leadership 
of the Brotherhood surprisingly withheld its usual rhetoric promoting an Islamic state. The public 
representation of the Muslim Brotherhood appeared calculatedly moderate during this period, 
which had the effect of softening the military’s position and drawing in support from groups on 
the fence. While this strategy had been effective at bringing the Muslim Brotherhood into the 
mainstream of civilian politics, the Brotherhood suddenly changed its stance in a coordinated 
move to join the protests on July 29. The sheer number of people who came to protest, at least 
two million, demonstrated the vastly superior organizational structure of the Brotherhood 
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compared to the student groups. Its ability to mobilize large groups of supporters through 
informal networks placed the Brotherhood at an advantage over the other civilian groups.  
In the July protests, the Brotherhood supporters also called for an election timeline, but 
instead pushed for the elections to be delayed until after a constitutional draft could be drawn. 
The Brotherhood raised these demands over concerns about whether the military would impose 
limitations on parliamentary elections in order to limit the power of the Muslim Brotherhood in 
the drafting of the constitution (El-Bendary 2013). The Brotherhood leadership believed that, if 
the constitution could be held through a referendum rather than in a military-controlled 
parliament, it would have greater control over the outcome. By holding the constitutional forum 
prior to the elections, it would preempt any action by the military council to create exceptions to 
increase its own power while limiting that of Islamist groups in the electoral system. As evidence 
of this, Tantawi had stated in the press that “supra-constitutional principles” should allow the 
military a “special role in protecting Egypt’s civil institutions and the equality of its citizens.” 
These issues were at the forefront of a “Consensus Conference” held by SCAF in June, prior to 
the protests by the Brotherhood. This debate reflected the latent tension that continued between 
the highly organized Islamist groups and the military that had not entirely gone away in the 
aftermath of the revolution. Many of the secular-liberal supported the inclusion of special 
provisos as a protective measure against “Islamists, such as the Brotherhood and Salafists, from 
adopting measures that would transform Egypt into a theocracy if they won the majority of 
parliamentary seats.”46 Despite the new, moderate stance presented by the Muslim Brotherhood, 
the secular-liberal bloc and the military leaders became aligned in their opposition to the Islamist 
bloc, regarding it with suspicion going into the elections. 
                                                          
46 Al-Ahram Online, “Egypt’s Consensus Conference Wants Military to Guarantee Secular Character of State,” Al-
Ahram, 19 June, 2011. http://english. Ahram.org.eg/News/14608.aspx. (Accessed 01 November 2014). 
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After the protests, SCAF appeared to give way to popular pressure as it announced a 
more definite timeline for holding elections, but it did so with some reservations. It scheduled 
Parliamentary elections to take place beginning in late November and the election of a new 
president to be held later in 2012. In the meantime, motions to draft a new constitution would be 
put on hold while SCAF could gain control over the process of forming an interim government. 
Recognizing the superior position of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) 
compared with other civilian parties, the military council established a number of constraints 
through amendments to the election process to prevent any single civilian group from acquiring a 
majority in either of the houses of parliament. In the upper house, the Shura Council, only 180 of 
the 270 total seats would be contested by civilian party candidates in the election. The remaining 
90 seats would be subject to appointments by the military. Similarly, the amendment allowed 
SCAF to appoint up to 10 seats in the People’s Assembly (IFES 2011, 3). Through these 
limitations, the military hoped to prevent the Brotherhood from acquiring a solid majority in 
Parliament. Although the Islamist bloc failed to secure its original goal of a constitutional 
referendum in early 2011, its leaders remained confident approaching the first set of elections. 
The FJP had a clear advantage against other political organizations in the amount of experience it 
had in mobilizing large numbers of supporters.  
Prior to the November elections, the rest of Egyptian society appeared to remain heavily 
divided between the Muslim Bloc and the less well organized secular-liberal parties. A well-
known Egyptian academic and reformer in the secular-nationalist bloc, Mohamed El-Baradei, 
identified the greatest challenge in the transition as the divisiveness in civil society, pointing out 
the numerous factions lacking in experience, not knowing “how to establish parties, how to 
engage...” (El-Baradei 2011). The student groups in particular lacked clear organization and 
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leadership that would allow them to form an effective coalition in the election. Moreover, the 
other significant segment of the secular liberal bloc, the preexisting centrist and liberal parties in 
Egyptian politics, continued to be divided against the new wave of younger activists despite 
having similar attitudes about reform. In return, the younger generation of the liberal bloc viewed 
the Wafd Party, the largest of the preexisting liberal parties, with low regard because of its 
tainted reputation under the regime. Because the Wafd Party had been one of the “tolerated 
opposition” in Mubarak’s electoral system, it had become ineffective as a political machine. It 
had no real experience mobilizing voters and lacked a definitive political platform with which to 
unite support in the secular-liberal bloc. While the Islamist bloc centered on the much better 
organization of the Muslim Brotherhood, it also suffered from divisions between the 
Brotherhood and the more radical Islamist parties led by the Salafist party Al Nour. From these 
divisions, the military council expected “a highly fragmented political race with no one party or 
coalition coming close to a majority of the national vote” (IFES 2011, 3). However, these 
expectations proved false with the emergence of the Islamist bloc as the dominant faction in 
parliament. The highly fragmented state of Egyptian politics on the eve of the election resulted in 
significant advantage for the Islamist bloc because political influence among the Islamists was 
much more concentrated in the formal structure of the Muslim Brotherhood, which had been able 
to mobilize large numbers of swing voters against the weak secular-liberal bloc. The outcomes of 
the Parliamentary elections signaled a shift from high factionalism to low factionalism in the 
elected government as power became concentrated in the Islamist bloc. 
In the election for the People’s Assembly in November, the FJP had nearly won a 
majority with 47% of the seats, but secured a strong majority through its coalition. The second 
largest portion of seats had been taken by the more radical Islamist party, Al Nour, with 25% of 
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total seats,47 altogether granting the Islamist bloc 70%. The largest winner of the secular-liberal 
parties had been the Wafd Party with only 8% of seats, leaving the remaining parties of the 
Egyptian Bloc alliance and the student organizations a miniscule number of seats. This left the 
already weak secular-liberal bloc at a severe disadvantage in the new government. The extent of 
this domination in the elections by the Islamist parties was the result of certain factors that 
benefited more experienced political organizations, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, while 
leaving “smaller and less entrenched parties” at a disadvantage (IFES 2011). The low solidarity 
among the parties of the secular-liberal bloc left a political vacuum in the space normally 
occupied by the regime’s National Democratic Party. The absence of an effective party to 
mobilize voters on behalf of the secular-liberal bloc allowed several of the Islamist parties to 
seize large portions of undecided voters. While SCAF had previously predicted a disadvantage 
for the Islamist bloc to come from divisions between the Salafists and the Muslim Brotherhood, 
this instead transformed into a major advantage. Because of the more radical platform of Al Nour 
and the weakness of the secular-liberal parties, many moderate voters considered the FJP to be 
the most feasible alternative to Al Nour. To draw in moderate voters, the FJP had been working 
to promote a more moderate image of itself and publicly touted the protection of civil liberties as 
one of its key agendas. Thus, in the absence of a viable party in the secular-liberal bloc, moderate 
voters began to embrace the FJP as a more liberal alternative to the Islamist platform of the 
Salafist alliance as long as the secular-liberal parties stood no chance of securing a majority. By 
the summer of 2012, the FJP had secured a solid majority in both houses of Parliament and 
Mohamed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood had become a clear frontrunner in the presidential 
election.  
                                                          
47 David D. Kirkpatrick, “Islamists Win 70% of Seats in the Egyptian Parliament,” New York Times, 21 January, 
2012. 
44 
 
As the Islamist bloc gained a secure majority in parliament, bargaining power in the 
civilian government became more heavily concentrated in the control of the majority parties. The 
rapid expansion of the Muslim Brotherhood in the new civilian government defied the military’s 
expectations of a fractionalized parliament and forced the military to adjust its strategy for 
controlling the transition process. After the Islamist parties had gained a solid majority in the 
upper house in early 2012, the Salafist party, Al-Nour, called for a snap presidential poll and for 
the formation of a constitutional drafting committee. In the absence of a viable candidate from 
the secular-nationalist bloc, SCAF fronted its own candidate in the elections, Ahmed Shafik, a 
former military cadre and prime minister in the Mubarak regime, who ran conspicuously as an 
independent. For the FJP ticket, Dr. Mohamed Morsi ran as the candidate supported by the well-
entrenched Islamic bloc. Without a suitable candidate representing the liberal political ideology 
of the student protesters of the January Revolution, moderate voters once again found themselves 
supporting the FJP, throwing their support behind Morsi rather than backing a former member of 
the Mubarak regime. Even given those circumstances, the small margin by which Morsi won the 
presidential election48 revealed the level of reluctance that many moderate voters had in backing 
the Islamist candidate, even with such an unpopular alternative. Had the opposition candidate 
been a politician that was more representative of the secular liberal bloc in Egyptian society, the 
outcome of the race may have been rather different. 
The election of Morsi as president and the subsequent actions to consolidate the political 
power of the Islamist bloc signified the complete transition of the civilian government to low 
factionalism with a dominant party. After gaining the presidency, Morsi and the Muslim 
                                                          
48 The presidential race ended with a much closer competition between the Muslim Brotherhood and their opponent, 
Ahmed Shafiq, who clearly represented the conservative political bloc of the military and the former regime. Morsi 
won the election by a 3% margin with 52% of the popular vote.  
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Brotherhood began a series of actions that would further solidify their majority hold on 
government. First, Morsi began by selecting cabinet members mostly from his own party or from 
other parties in the Islamist bloc, with only a few exceptions. In the case of the exceptions, such 
as a Coptic Minister of Tourism, the appointments gave an impression of inclusivity for the new 
presidency, but later appeared to be purely symbolic as Morsi would continually exclude these 
figures from important decisions. Although the FJP had appeared more inclusive during the 
electoral race, it gradually became apparent that Morsi would advance the interests of the 
dominant faction with little regard to the minority parties. 
Morsi’s most significant move came one month after his election when he suddenly fired 
the entire senior military leadership in SCAF. It is important to note that, at the moment when 
the military’s top leadership would have had high motivation to take measures to counteract the 
new government, they refrained from doing so. In what the Egyptian press referred to as Morsi’s 
“August Coup,”49 General Tantawi and his senior staff quietly relinquished power after being 
sacked. Morsi subsequently abolished SCAF, which was viewed as a residual institution of the 
regime, and appointed a lesser known general, Abdel Fattah el-Sissi, to the newly created 
position of Minister of Defense and Military Production. This event indicated certain aspects 
about the military that are interesting to note. Most importantly, the military would not 
necessarily be led to take extreme measures to intervene in civilian politics to protect the power 
of individual leaders as long as the core interests of the military were protected. The fact that the 
military remained in the barracks during the August Coup suggested that the military as a whole 
                                                          
49 Morsi sacked Tantawi and his staff after a terrorist attack, which took place on August 12. However, this was 
commonly viewed by the generals as a purely opportunistic move by Morsi to completely consolidate his power 
over the military, which remained as the only major threat to his power. In addition to Tantawi, he dismissed Army 
Chief of Staff Sami Enan and the commanders of the Navy and Air Force (See Zvi Barel, 2012, “Egypt Security 
Officials: Dismissal of Army Top Brass Thwarted a Coup Attempt,” Haaretz, 15 August, 2012; Christian Science 
Moniter, August 12, 2012; Dan Murphy, “Egypt’s President Morsi Fires Senior General Tantawi, Asserting His 
Power,” Christian Science Monitor, 12 August, 2012). 
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was willing to allow the democratic transition to continue on its current path, even if the political 
careers of individual officers were ended early. In this way, the August Coup demonstrated that 
other conditions would have to be met first before the whole of the military could be brought to 
intervene in civilian politics. The corporate interests of the military organization would have to 
come under threat before such extreme measures could be taken. However, in such an event, the 
low factionalism of the military would enable it to take this course of action with a lower risk of 
low commitment from some of its officers. 
In the fall of 2012, the Islamist bloc in parliament began to more aggressively pursue the 
drafting of a new constitution while it maintained a strong majority. In late August, Morsi 
announced that the drafting of Egypt’s new constitution would be accelerated ahead of its 
previously established timeline to be completed by the end of September. The timing of the 
announcement coincided with the dismissal of the generals, suggesting that Morsi and the 
Brotherhood had needed to remove that obstacle before advancing with the creation of a 
constitution, which had been a central point of debate with SCAF. To ensure that he had 
complete power to push the process of the constitutional draft forward, Morsi also cancelled a 
decree issued earlier in the year by SCAF that limited the president’s powers. The Egyptian 
Constitutional Assembly of 2012 became the source of growing tension between the civilian 
government and the military. Crucially, because the Islamist bloc had secured such a solid 
majority in the legislative and executive branches of government, it rendered any institutional 
checks in the system curbing the power of the executive ineffective. The last branch of 
government outside of the control of the Islamists, the judiciary, was the last bastion of 
opposition to the Islamist majority in the Egyptian government. The Supreme Constitutional 
Court (SCC) in Egypt had the sole legal right to interpret laws issued by the Legislative 
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Authority and to determine the constitutionality of laws and decrees issued by the head of state. 
However, at that time, it had little power to enforce its pronouncements because of the Islamist 
bloc’s majority. When the SCC declared that the president’s decrees regarding the new 
constitution exceeded his legal powers, he simply issued an emergency decree to disband the 
judiciary to reduce its influence over the constitutional amendment process. Because of the 
dominance of the Islamist coalition in parliament, Morsi had greater leverage in the executive to 
disregard the last government branch outside of his control. In an interview after the decision to 
disband the SCC, Morsi remarked the following: 
“I know perfectly what it means to have separation between three powers, executive 
power, legislative power and the judiciary. This is the main concept about a state based on 
institutions. The people are the original source of power. The president represents the 
executive power, and the president is elected by the people.”50  
 
This statement reflects Morsi’s attitudes regarding the roles of the different branches of 
government in a democracy. While Morsi openly spoke about the importance of democratic 
checks on power, he based his position on a fundamentally different interpretation of these 
checks as something having more symbolic importance than a practical purpose in preventing 
authoritarian government. He interpreted his role in the presidency differently, as drawing its 
authority from the original, legitimate source of power the majority. In this way, he understood 
democracy as a system designed to serve the majority rather than to provide framework for 
reaching consensus with the minority. 
The Islamist majority dominated the committees to draft the new constitution and the 
minority parties were excluded from the process despite Morsi’s statements to the contrary.51 
                                                          
50 Mohamed Morsi, “Transcript: TIME’s Interview with Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi,” TIME, 28 November, 
2012. 
51 Non-Islamist cabinet members complained in retrospect that they had been simply ignored on all major policy 
issues and were marginalized during the constitutional drafting process. Ultimately, this prompted five government 
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The minority members of Parliament viewed the accelerated pace of the amendment process 
with alarm because it would enable the Islamist parties to achieve their core objective of creating 
an Islamic constitution. Representatives in the opposition camp, including members of the 
Egyptian Bloc, the New Wafd, and the April 6 Youth Movement, challenged constitutional 
amendments that were based on Islamic law, drafted by the committees. In response to the 
protests of the political minority, President Morsi took another extreme step in October to speed 
along the process by temporarily freezing the houses of Parliament. Defending his actions, Morsi 
expressed the importance of the constitution, referring to the disagreements in Parliament as 
“some sort of misunderstanding from a few.”52 Throughout the process, Morsi worked closely 
with the committee to meet the tight timeline of drafting a constitution in two months. Although 
he insisted that the process was taking place without his interference, Morsi had personally 
issued the decrees, ordering Parliament to create the constitutional committees and personally 
took responsibility to present articles to the committees for review, all while Parliament itself 
had been disbanded. He appeared confident about his level of direct involvement, remarking, 
“Now we don’t have a parliament, so I am responsible for issuing laws...”53 By the time the 
constitution was held for a vote in the spring, it had already been drafted without seeking 
consensus from the minority parties of Parliament and contained numerous clauses that applied 
Islamic law. Without any other recourse, around 25% of the members of parliament, mainly 
consisting of the non-Islamist members of parliament, walked out of the session in protest 
                                                          
ministers to resign on July 1, 2013 (Al-Jazeera, “Egypt Ministers Resign amid Unrest,” 01 July, 2013; See El-
Baradei 2012). 
52 Mohamed Morsi, “Egypt’s Mohamed Morsi remains defiant as fears of civil war grow,” The Guardian, 30 June, 
2013. 
53 Mohamed Morsi, “Transcript: TIME’s Interview with Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi,” TIME, 28 November, 
2012. 
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against the draft proposal. As a result, the vote only consisted of members from the Islamist bloc 
parties, giving the appearance that it had been near unanimous. 
As the constitution was passed, opposition to the Islamist-dominated government 
continued outside of parliament because it had such a powerful majority in government. In the 
disorder of the secular-liberal bloc, yet another ad hoc organization came to the fore, this time to 
confront the Islamist constitution and the exclusive politics of the new government. The 
Tamarod54 Movement announced in June it would collect 14 million signatures by 29 June, 
which would call for Morsi’s resignation. The disorganized nature of the movement meant that it 
collected only around 8.5 million signatures, but it led a new wave of large protests that rivaled 
those of the 2011 revolution. By July, the numbers of protesters in Tahrir Square alone were 
estimated by the Ministry of the Interior to be between 14 and 17 million (Aljazeera 2013). 
Opposition leaders, which had been unsuccessful in influencing policies through institutional 
means began speaking out in the media to show their disapproval of Morsi’s methods. The 
prominent secular-liberal opposition leader and Member of Parliament, Mohamed El-Baradei, 
hosted an academic conference provocatively entitled “After the Departure” along with several 
other prominent opposition politicians.55 Various non-Islamist politicians within Morsi’s 
administration increasingly complained that they had been marginalized from key policy 
decisions and that their advice largely ignored by President Morsi. Sparking further controversy 
on July 1, five non-Islamist ministers resigned in protest against the Morsi administration 
(Aljazeera 2013). Meanwhile, Morsi appeared unconcerned. Reacting to the new protests, he 
insisted, “[Society] is not pulling apart. It’s not pulling apart. It’s a majority and opposition. I can 
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55 Mohamed ElBaradei, “IBA Annual Conference Opening Ceremony,” Aljazeera, 30 October, 2011. 
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see it very clear.”56 In the perspective of the administration, because factionalism was so low in 
government, it had power to pass new legislation without consulting with the minority political 
groups. 
While low factionalism in the government caused it to behave in a majoritarian fashion 
with little regard for the political opposition, military leaders became increasingly concerned.57 
Historically, the military had been aligned with the secular-conservative political bloc of the 
Mubarak regime and remained ideologically opposed to political Islam. After eliminating SCAF, 
Morsi had taken for granted that its leadership had come under control of the administration as 
General Abdul Fattah el-Sissi had been a pious Muslim all his life and had been selected by the 
administration to replace Tantawi in August 2012. However, the majority of the officers in the 
military appeared to remain tied to the military’s traditional allies in the secular-liberal and 
conservative blocs.58 While Morsi may have assumed the threat of the military had been 
neutralized, its low factionalism meant that military leaders would give greater consideration to 
the corporate interests of the military over personal political connections. During the Morsi 
administration, revenues from industries controlled by the military were sinking due to an 
economic downturn in the wake of the transition and Morsi’s policies received blame.59 In 
addition, most officers in the military remained distrustful of the Muslim Brotherhood as did 
                                                          
56 Mohamed Morsi, “Transcript: TIME’s Interview with Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi,” TIME, 28 November, 
2012. 
57 General Sissi stated retrospectively that he had attempted to council President Morsi numerous times throughout 
this period and that he had become concerned about the level of unity in Egyptian society (See Washington Post, 
“Rare Interview with Egyptian Gen. Abdel Fatah al-Sissi,” 03 August, 2013. 
58 Following the transition, the military had continually showed a reluctance to work with the Muslim Brotherhood, 
preferring instead to appoint secular-liberals such as Mohamed El-Baradei and members of the Wafd Party, such as 
Coptic Egyptian, Fakry Abdel Nour, in the interim government. During the Presidential election, without a viable 
candidate from the minority parties, the military fronted its own candidate with no party affiliation to compete 
against Mohamed Morsi. 
59 During this period, the value of the Egyptian pound had decreased by 20% and many people in the opposition and 
the military were increasingly upset by Morsi’s economic policies (See al-Jazeera, “Egypt Ministers Resign amid 
Unrest,” 01 July 2013). 
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members of the minority parties in Parliament. As a result, they kept open channels of 
communication with members of the political opposition throughout the Morsi administration. El 
Baradei later admitted after these events that he had regularly spoken with el-Sissi about how to 
react to Morsi’s handling of the constitutional drafting.60 In this way, the military had continued 
to be politically aligned with the minority opposition to the current administration. However, it 
could not oppose Morsi through normal political means because its allied civilian faction had too 
little influence in the government. 
With the protests growing every day, achieving a turnout higher than the 2011 revolution, 
El-Sissi encouraged Morsi to meet some of the demands of the opposition. However, Morsi 
refused and continued to describe the protests as manifestations of the previous regime and the 
opposition “trying to rock the boat,” instead of considering them as legitimate participants in the 
political process. He viewed it as his responsibility as the president to look into the actions of 
“whoever... doesn’t observe the benefit of the majority of the people.”61 As the military began to 
advocate for the demands of the protesters,62 Morsi and his administration continually ignored 
the advice of the officers. Sissi later reflected that he had met with Morsi around three times in 
the last week of June to persuade him of the need to become more inclusive of the minority 
political groups.63 However, after violence in front of the presidential palace in Cairo resulted in 
7 deaths and 300 injured, Sissi withdrew from the President and began communicating 
secretively with members of the opposition about the possibility of change in government and 
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urged “all political factions to reach consensus by the following Sunday.”64 This unwillingness to 
negotiate with military leaders who were allied with the opposition parties finally led to the 
confrontation that ended the Morsi administration in the following month. On July 1, Sissi 
publicly issued a statement giving an ultimatum to the President Morsi to give in to the demands 
of the protesters. In it, he remarked, “There is a state of division in society and the continuation 
of it is a danger to the Egyptian state and there must be consensus among all.”65 The military 
staged a coup on July 3, arresting president Morsi and disbanding the Islamist dominated 
administration, ending Egypt’s first democratically elected government. 
With low factionalism in the government after the elections, the Morsi administration had 
developed a majoritarian stance that excluded opposition parties and the military from the 
constitutional amendment process. The low factionalism in the military placed it in a stronger 
position to oppose policies of the civilian government it disagreed with and enabled it to 
intervene if no other viable options existed for influencing policy. Because the political allies of 
the military in parliament had become so excluded by the dominant faction in government, the 
military was unable to have an impact on policy-making after the election. Thus, leaders of the 
military determined an intervention to be the only way of preventing an Islamic constitution in 
the absence of other options. The coup that ended Egypt’s democracy resulted from three 
important factors. First, the dominant organization of the Muslim Brotherhood ensured that other 
civilian political groups would become severely disadvantaged in the democratically elected 
government. Second, the lack of an institutional basis guaranteeing a consensus-based process 
for creating new policies enabled the dominant group with low factionalism to entirely exclude 
minority parties from policy making. Third, the failure of the government to produce consensus 
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in parliament with the opposition parties prevented the military from using its connections with 
civilian leaders to resolve a conflict through regular political means.  
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IV: Conclusion: Indonesia and Egypt Compared 
 
 The purpose of this paper has been to compare two cases of democratic transitions in to 
identify factors that influence their different outcomes. In my analysis, I have attempted to give 
greater attention to the role of civilians in the transition process, following the example of other 
studies of democratic transitions (Cottey et al 2002; Mietzner 2009, 2014). However, I have also 
concentrated on role of the military, regarding the military and the civilian government as 
equally important actors in the cases of Indonesia and Egypt. In this way, the analysis has 
focused more directly on the relationship between the government and the military, identifying 
factionalism as one of the principle contributors to the success or failure of democratic 
transitions. For this type of analysis to work, the selected cases need to be similar enough in the 
initial phase of the transition that they have a basis for comparison. Indonesia and Egypt meet 
this requirement as a number of factors during the initial transition period line up quite well. In 
both cases, the country had emerged from a several decades-long period of authoritarian 
government, which had had strong ties to the military. The previous regime in both cases had 
applied similar strategies to create legitimacy for the regime by controlling a limited number of 
parties in a “tolerated opposition.” As a result, civil society and the military were in comparable 
situations at the beginning of the democratic transitions in both societies. In this way the 
circumstances of the relationship between civilian groups and the military at different periods 
during the transition had an impact on the different trajectories in each case. Focusing on the 
groups with significant influence within the military and in civilian political parties, this paper 
has identified factors that affect the relationship between the military and civilians by creating or 
mitigating conflict. Different levels of factionalism in the military and the elected government 
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shape the interaction between the two groups and consequently are a crucial factor affecting the 
success of democratic transitions. 
Factionalism in the Military 
 In Indonesia and Egypt, the military establishments found themselves in crises as they 
had to choose between continuing to support an aging regime that was losing legitimacy and a 
new civilian political system that would be more difficult to control. Both the Indonesian and 
Egyptian militaries had vested interests in the regime and stood to lose power in the new 
government, but in both cases military leaders took calculated risks to support a political change 
because the old regime was unsustainable. In Indonesia, many civilian leaders had already begun 
to voice their intentions to reform the structure of the military in order to permanently reduce its 
presence in politics. While the Egyptian military had not become as heavily involved in the 
operations of government as the Indonesian military had during the Suharto regime, it 
nevertheless enjoyed a certain degree of political influence in Mubarak’s administration with the 
majority of ministry positions going to former officers. Although Mubarak maintained a strong 
system of top-down control over the military, Egypt’s military did not differ in this respect from 
the Indonesian military, which also received direct appointments and directives from President 
Suharto throughout the New Order Era. Additionally, the Egyptian and Indonesian militaries 
both had rather major economic interests as each controlled vast segments of important 
industries. Networks of corruption in Egypt and Indonesia allowed the military leaders to 
maintain access to revenues from military operated businesses. In this way, the Egyptian and 
Indonesian militaries had roughly similar interests at the time of the respective regime changes.  
 However, the militaries in Indonesia and Egypt took different courses of action to secure 
their interests from the rapid changes associated with the political transitions. These different 
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trajectories resulted from important differences primarily in how the military structures were 
organized. The Indonesian military had become increasingly factionalized throughout the New 
Order period because of the extent of its involvement in national and local politics as well as 
Suharto’s particular strategy of dividing his generals against one another (Said 2006; Mietzner 
2009). The doctrine of “dual function”66 in the Indonesian military had been used by the New 
Order regime to justify the direct participation of military members in civilian government. 
Unlike the Egyptian military, the Indonesian military allowed its members to retain their rank 
and status in the military hierarchy while simultaneously holding an appointment in a national 
civilian body, such as the Indonesian Parliament. Throughout its existence, the New Order 
regime maintained a sham electoral system, in which majorities in both houses of parliament and 
key minister positions remained filled by military officers. While this was true to a lesser extent 
in Mubarak’s Egypt, the Egyptian military did not follow the same organizational structure of the 
Indonesian military that allowed it to exist in a parallel format to local governments. The 
regional command system of the Indonesian military, originating in the pre-independence period 
during the 1940s, enabled it to maintain direct influence at every level of civilian government 
from the village administration to districts and regencies.67 The extent of the Indonesian 
military’s integration into civilian politics went well beyond the Egyptian military’s level of 
political involvement. Simultaneously, Suharto’s method of managing the military differed from 
Mubarak’s as it deliberately promoted competition within the ranks to create factions. This 
strategy of encouraging factionalism prevented any one of Suharto’s generals from acquiring too 
much influence to directly challenge him. Although this strategy eventually failed to protect the 
regime from collapse in 1998, Suharto’s political maneuvering had successfully produced 
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divisions that would raise the level of factionalism in the Indonesian military prior to Indonesia’s 
democratic transition. By contrast to the Indonesian military in 1998, Egypt’s military at the 
beginning of 2011 continued to enjoy very high organizational integrity and low levels of 
factionalism. 
Factionalism in the Elected Government 
 Civil society in Egypt on the eve of the January Revolution mirrored Indonesian civil 
society in 1998 in many respects. In both countries, the previous regime had heavily restricted 
electoral systems and confined political competition to a small number of tolerated parties. In 
Indonesia, Suharto had limited the number of opposition parties to three, which existed only as a 
symbolic opposition in order to prop up and legitimize the regime. The most prominent 
opposition party, the PDI-P,68 had never been permitted to gain a majority in the military-
dominated Parliament and only became a real challenger to the regime during the upheaval of the 
1997 crisis. The regime party, Golkar, maintained a continuous majority in Parliament 
throughout the New Order Era as the official political party of the military. Following Suharto’s 
resignation, however, the number of registered parties in Indonesia increased rapidly. Similarly 
to Indonesia, Egypt under Mubarak had only a small number of parties allowed to compete in 
sham elections, in which the regime’s party, the NDP, maintained the majority of seats. As in 
Indonesia, the number of registered parties prior to the first democratic elections held in 2011 
grew to an unprecedentedly large number. In both countries, the large number of newly created 
parties gave immediately following the regime’s collapse gave way to a heavily contentious 
political environment among civilian parties. 
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 However, while the initial circumstances were comparable, the two cases diverged from 
one another during the elections to create the new civilian governments. In the case of Indonesia, 
civilian parties remained divided in the houses of Parliament between several smaller, weaker 
coalitions, which struggled to promote coherent policies. The high levels of factionalism in the 
Indonesian government meant that no single party or coalition of parties could create a strong 
enough majority to dominate all policy decisions. The post-transition presidency in Indonesia 
depended on a relatively weak political coalition in Parliament, which shifted the moment a 
major disagreement emerged. Consequently, the military reform agenda of the Wahid Presidency 
struggled to gain momentum as it gradually lost support from the other factions in parliament, 
which formed new alliances with members of the military. High factionalism in Indonesian civil 
society prevented Wahid from wielding power to the extent that he could exclude other groups 
from policy decisions. By contrast, Egypt’s election resulted in a large and highly organized 
political bloc that dominated both parliament and the presidency. In the wake of the revolution, 
the Islamist bloc had a significant advantage over the rest of civil society because it had already 
developed its support through many years of opposing the previous regime. While the secular-
liberal bloc of political parties consisted of a large number of disorganized groups, the Islamist 
bloc in Egypt was effective at organizing support and securing a great majority of the votes 
during the election. The Islamist segment of Egypt’s civil society different significantly from 
Indonesia’s as it had continuously functioned outside of the official system of tolerated parties 
under the regime and had emerged as one of the few experienced parties that was untainted by an  
association with the regime. In Egypt’s first free elections, the Islamist parties, consisting mainly 
of the Salifist Al Nour and the FJP, acquired an overwhelming majority in the parliamentary 
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elections. In this way, the Morsi government had very low factionalism as it enjoyed support 
from a strong coalition of Islamist parties following the elections.  
Different Outcomes 
 Although Egypt and Indonesia had similar circumstances surrounding their democratic 
transitions, the levels of factionalism of the military and civil society in each case differed 
dramatically. These differences in factionalism determined the type of relationship between the 
military and civil society and contributed to the different outcomes of the democratic transitions 
in the two cases. In the case of Indonesia, the high factionalism of the elected government within 
civil society rendered it incapable of effectively imposing its will unilaterally on various aspects 
of reform. Wahid’s increasingly authoritarian tendencies had driven an increasing number of 
civilian parties into the opposition. Simultaneously, the high factionalism in the military and its 
history of political alliances with civilians enabled various military factions to form a number of 
coalitions with civilian politicians. As a result, when President Wahid attempted to impose a 
series of rapid reforms targeting the military, factions in the military succeeded in limiting the 
power of the presidency through its alliance with the opposition parties. In this way, political 
alliances that existed between factions in the military and civil society enabled military leaders to 
secure their interests through civilian political channels. Thus, the ability of groups to negotiate 
with each other across the civil-military divide prevented a coup from taking place. 
In contrast to Indonesia, Egypt after the 2012 presidential election witnessed the 
emergence of an unchallengeable majority in the elected government, consisting of the Muslim 
Brotherhood and its coalition of Islamic parties. In Egypt, the low factionalism in civil society 
enabled the elected government to begin unilaterally imposing its Islamist political agenda. In the 
absence of a constitutional framework that limited the power of the different branches of 
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government, the Islamist political majority could begin to implement various aspects of its 
platform without seeking consultation from the minority opposition. As a result, the military, 
which had continued to retain its ties with politicians in the conservative bloc of parties including 
the NDP, had no normal political channels through which it could have its own interests 
represented. During this period, the military remained ideologically opposed to Islamist politics. 
While many officers continued to adhere to the secular nationalist ideology of the Free Officers 
Movement,69 others simply disapproved of the government’s handling of the economy and the 
current political protests.70 By contrast to Indonesia, low factionalism in the military meant that it 
could reliably count on its constituent parts to take a more committed course of united action 
against the civilian government if it felt its interests to be significantly threatened. Leading up to 
the July Coup in 2013, the Morsi administration continued to ignore pleas by opposition parties 
and minority groups in civil society to incorporate the opposition into the process of drafting the 
new constitution. Simultaneously, frequent warnings from the commander of the military, El-
Sissi, to pay greater attention to the demands of protesters continued to go unheeded by President 
Morsi. In the days leading up to the July Coup in 2013, these circumstances created a 
combustible relationship between the military and the government. The very low factionalism of 
the civilian government under Morsi led the military to view the high costs associated with a 
coup as acceptable because of its inability to influence politics through its political connections 
with civilians. Given the low factionalism within its ranks, the military knew it could 
successfully lead a coup with minimal costs to its own integrity and legitimacy. Thus, while the 
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Indonesian military never resorted to such extreme measures to influence policy in Indonesia’s 
transition, the Egyptian military chose to intervene in early July, 2013. 
The differences between these two cases demonstrate the importance of the type of 
relationship that prevails between civilians and the military throughout a political transition. As 
these cases show, the stability of that relationship depends in large part on the level of 
factionalism in both groups. Higher factionalism in the military and civil society produces more 
stable outcomes because it enables consensus to form between factions on both sides. By 
contrast, new democracies based on rule by the majority create disagreements that are 
unresolvable through political dialogue as long as institutions that put limitations on the power of 
the majority do not exist. As the comparison of these two cases shows, the ideological basis for a 
new democracy can have a major impact on the potential for conflict, depending on whether the 
elected government bases its legitimacy on the presence of an overly strong majority. The high 
factionalism in civilian politics and the military in Indonesia allowed various political alliances 
to emerge between civil society and the military, allowing the military and the elected 
government to settle a major disagreement without a coup. In Egypt, low factionalism in civil 
society and the military reduced the potential for dialogue between military and civilian leaders, 
increasing the potential for conflict. Because of different dynamics between factions in the 
civilian government and the military in Egypt and Indonesia, two drastically different examples 
of democracy emerged with different long-term impacts for their political transitions. 
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